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ABSTRACT
Background: The adverse relation between dietary trans fatty acid
(TFA) intake and coronary artery disease risk is well established.
Many countries in the European Union (EU) and worldwide have
implemented different policies to reduce the TFA intake of their
populations.
Objective: The aim of this study was to assess the added value of
EU-level action by estimating the cost-effectiveness of 3 possible
EU-level policy measures to reduce population dietary TFA intake.
This was calculated against a reference situation of not implement-
ing any EU-level policy (i.e., by assuming only national or self-
regulatory measures).
Design: We developed a mathematical model to compare different
policy options at the EU level: 1) to do nothing beyond the current
state (reference situation), 2) to impose mandatory TFA labeling of
prepackaged foods, 3) to seek voluntary agreements toward further
reducing industrially produced TFA (iTFA) content in foods, and 4)
to impose a legislative limit for iTFA content in foods.
Results: The model indicated that to impose an EU-level legal limit
or to make voluntary agreements may, over the course of a lifetime
(85 y), avoid the loss of 3.73 and 2.19 million disability-adjusted
life-years (DALYs), respectively, and save .51 and 23 billion euros
when compared with the reference situation. Implementing manda-
tory TFA labeling can also avoid the loss of 0.98 million DALYs,
but this option incurs more costs than it saves compared with the
reference option.
Conclusions: The model indicates that there is added value of an
EU-level action, either via a legal limit or through voluntary agree-
ments, with the legal limit option producing the highest additional
health benefits. Introducing mandatory TFA labeling for the EU
common market may provide some additional health benefits; how-
ever, this would likely not be a cost-effective strategy. Am J
Clin Nutr doi: 10.3945/ajcn.116.136911.
Keywords: European Union, cost-effectiveness, public health,
public policy, trans fatty acids
INTRODUCTION
trans Fatty acids (TFAs)4 are a type of unsaturated fatty acid
that have$1 unsaturated, nonconjugated double bond in the trans
configuration. TFA intake can be of industrial (mainly partially
hydrogenated oils) or natural (ruminant food sources) origin (1).
The detrimental effects of dietary intake of industrially produced
TFAs (iTFAs) on heart health were first reported in the 1990s (2)
and are now well established (3–5). Other health effects have
been attributed to iTFA intake, such as on insulin sensitivity,
obesity, diabetes, cancer, or early growth and development (3,
6). Most official guidelines recommend limiting daily TFA in-
take as much as possible within an adequate diet or to intakes
of ,1% or 2% of total energy (E%) (7). Many countries world-
wide have policies to reduce population TFA intake (8); these
are accompanied by significant reductions in food TFA content,
with the largest reductions being observed in situations in which
legal limits on TFAs are in place (9).
In the European Union (EU), dietary TFA intake has been
decreasing since the 1980–1990s, from as high as 4.3 E% in
elderly Dutch men in 1985 (9) to average population intakes
,1 E% in the 2000s (1, 10, 11). These estimates include both
iTFAs and TFAs from ruminant sources, with the latter contrib-
uting between 0.3 and 0.8 E% depending on dietary habits (11).
Although less is known about dietary TFA intakes in Eastern
Europe, data on TFA content of selected foods sampled between
2005 and 2014 suggest somewhat higher amounts than in most
other parts of Europe (12–14). Recent data also suggest that the
reduction in iTFAs in foods continued in some, but not all, Euro-
pean countries from 2006 to 2013 (13) and 2012 to 2014 (12).
Several health economic models suggest that reducing pop-
ulation iTFA intakes provides health benefits [i.e., reductions in
cardiovascular disease or coronary artery disease (CAD)–related
events and deaths as well as cost savings] (15–18). Restrepo and
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Rieger (19) estimated that the 2004 legal limit on iTFAs in
Denmark has preventedw14.2 deaths $ 100,000 persons21 $ y21.
Another study suggests that introducing a legal limit on iTFAs in
England would preventw7200 deaths from CAD (or 2.6% of all
predicted CAD deaths) between 2015 and 2020, providing the
greatest health benefits and reduction in the inequality gap when
compared with improved TFA labeling or TFA removal from
restaurants and fast foods (20). Because the EU and its member
states are currently evaluating the impact of possible measures at
the EU level (21, 22), this study presents an economic evaluation to
compare the cost-effectiveness of 3 different policy options against
the option of taking no action at the EU level (reference situation).
METHODS
Model development
We developed a computer-simulated, Markov, state-transition
model with the use of Excel (Microsoft Office 2010). This type of
model is appropriate because Markov models are suitable for
changing systems (i.e., where there is movement or transitions
between different states). In this case, the different states are the
conditions in which an individual can be, such as “well,” with
“CAD” or “history of CAD,” or “dead” (see Figure 1). In ad-
dition, because the available data are population-based, discrete
simulation models cannot be used and a cohort model such as
Markov should be chosen instead. The International Society for
Pharmacoeconomics and Outcome Research-Society for Clinical
Decision Making (ISPOR-SMDM) Modeling Good Research
Practices Task Force recommends Markov models for this kind
of analysis (23, 24).
The TFA intake, defined as E%, as a starting point for the
model (“today”) was calculated as described in Supplemental
Tables 1–3). The model was applied to the EU population and
accounts for all costs and effects applicable or resulting from the
following policy options over the course of a lifetime (85 y)
(25):
1) Reference situation (no action at the EU level): The refer-
ence situation is described by the highest cumulative TFA
intake (i.e., the highest population TFA intake when sum-
ming up yearly population TFA intakes over the modeled
time horizon of 85 y) in all of the 4 options, and therefore
it also entails the highest risk of CAD. Nevertheless, even
for this case of “no action at EU level,” in the model we
assume a continued decrease in TFA consumption that
leads to a removal of iTFAs from the food supply over
10 y due to continuous innovation in the industry and
efforts at the national or regional levels. In terms of costs,
there are no added public costs from implementing this
policy option; all costs result from CAD-associated mor-
bidity and loss of productivity.
2) Voluntary agreements: With this option policy makers ac-
tively seek agreements at the EU level, such as with the
food industry and retailers to introduce measures that reduce
TFA amounts in foods and/or between EU member states,
to agree on a common framework toward reducing TFAs
in foods and diets similarly to the EU salt reduction frame-
work (26). In this case, public costs are CAD-associated
and are also related to food inspection programs to monitor
and evaluate the agreements. We assume a faster reduction
in TFA consumption than in option 1, leading to a quicker
removal of iTFAs from the food supply due to the addi-
tional private-public commitments. For this strategy in the
model we assume the total removal of iTFAs from the food
supply after 5 y, half the time needed in the absence of EU-
level action (reference situation), albeit acknowledging
that the rare use of iTFA-containing raw materials by some
producers and imports of iTFA-containing foods from
countries in which the iTFA issue has not been addressed
cannot be excluded.
3) Mandatory TFA labeling: With this strategy the existing
rules for the nutrition declaration on foods as governed by
EU regulation 1169/2011 would be changed to require the
disclosure of the TFA contents in all prepackaged foods.
This provides an incentive for food reformulation toward
reducing or replacing iTFAs, but only for prepackaged
foods. Because this option requires legislative action, in
addition to CAD-associated public costs, other non–CAD-
related public costs are also considered. These are linked
to the implementation of the legislation (mass media
costs), worksite interventions, consumer education, and
nutrition counseling as well as food inspection (9). The
reduction in population TFA intake is faster than in the
reference situation but slightly slower than in option 2
(voluntary agreements), because in this case there are only
incentives toward reducing TFA content in prepackaged
foods. The assumption in the model is that iTFA removal
is faster in prepackaged foods than in options 1 (reference)
and 2, but not in non-prepackaged foods, in which iTFA
FIGURE 1 Schematic representation of the Markov model used to sim-
ulate how people move in yearly cycles through 4 health states in each of the
policy options. The 4 health states are as follows: “Well” (the state for each
individual with no history of CAD; a person can remain here until death or
move to “CAD”); “CAD” (individuals who have CAD move to this state for
a maximum of 1 y; from this state, individuals can move either to “History of
CAD” or “Death” but not back to the “Well” state); “History of CAD” (post–
acute CAD health state; survivors from a “CAD” state move to this state
until death or until they suffer a new CAD event, in which case they move to
the “CAD” state); and “Death” [this is an absorbing state (once a person
enters this state, they cannot leave it); any individual can move to “Death” at
any time]. The meaning of each transition probability between health states
is as follows: 1) probability of keeping well (in this context, staying alive and
not having a CAD event), 2) probability of experiencing a CAD event for
persons without a previous CAD event, 3) probability of surviving a CAD
event, 4) probability of staying alive in the post–acute CAD state, 5) prob-
ability of experiencing a new CAD event when in the post–acute CAD state,
6) probability of death from any cause (except from CAD) for persons
without a previous CAD event, 7) probability of death from a CAD event,
and 8) probability of death from any cause except for CAD for individuals
with a history of CAD. CAD, coronary artery disease.
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removal proceeds at the same speed as in the reference
option 1. The model assumes population TFA intake re-
ductions for the first 2 y until TFA content labeling is
available for all prepackaged foods, as in the reference
situation (option 1), then a faster reduction in iTFA intake
from prepackaged foods, which, based on the available
information (see Supplemental Table 2), is assumed to
contribute to 50% of population TFA intake at the start
and decrease to 0% in 3 y. The model assumes that re-
ductions in iTFAs from non-prepackaged foods continue at
the same speed as in the reference situation albeit ac-
knowledging that, in reality, some spillover effects in the
efforts to remove iTFAs from prepackaged foods might
also be expected for non-prepackaged foods.
4) Legal limit of iTFA content in foods: This option sees
a restriction in the use of iTFAs in the food supply through
a legislative limit, such as that already introduced by some
EU member states (Denmark, Austria, Hungary, and Lat-
via). This measure results in a fast removal of iTFAs in all
of the EU food supply and represents therefore the lowest
cumulative TFA consumption of all 4 options. The model
assumes the total removal of iTFAs in 2 y. This strategy
implies, in addition to CAD-associated public costs, other
costs that are not associated with CAD such as public costs
for food inspection programs.
The model simulates how people are moving in yearly cycles
through 4 health states, as shown in Figure 1. Costs (of policy
implementation and CAD-related) and effects [CAD incidence
and disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs)] are accounted for as
the population circulates through the model. These are calculated
for each policy option and then compared with one another. An
annual discount rate of 3.5% is applied to both costs and effects
following best-practice guidelines (25). The economic evaluation
presented here is broader than a simple evaluation focused on
health system costs because it also includes a societal perspec-
tive: the costs included are not only health care–related costs but
also indirect costs stemming from informal care and loss of
productivity due to mortality and morbidity as well as policy
implementation–related public costs.
Costs
All of the costs considered to account for the burden of TFAs
have been adjusted for inflation to 2011 prices (in V); currency
exchanges, when applicable, were calculated on the basis of 1
January 2011 exchange rates to the euro. The model considers 3
types of costs (see also Table 1):
 Health care costs: These costs stem from the use of health
resources (i.e., primary care costs, outpatient costs, emer-
gency costs, and medication used during the hospitaliza-
tion). The costs are based on the European Cardiovascular
Disease Statistics 2012 (28).
 Non–health care costs: This group of costs includes all
non–health care costs related to the disease, namely loss
of productivity and informal care. The costs are based on
the European Cardiovascular Disease Statistics 2012 (28).
 Costs of policy-associated measures: Each policy option
(apart from option 1 “reference situation”) incurs costs re-
lated to the execution of measures needed for their success-
ful implementation.
The costs associated with each of the measures are described in
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
TABLE 1
Model variables and their source, deterministic value, and distribution type1
Variable description Source (reference) Deterministic value Distribution2
Probability of death from acute CAD Data from HFA-DB (27) Life tables Log-normal
Probability of death from any cause Data from HFA-DB (27) Life tables Log-normal
Probability of CAD Hospital discharges by IHD; data from HFA-DB (27) Morbidity table Log-normal
Reduction in RR of CAD in legal limit strategy Mozzafarian et al. (4), O’Flaherty et al. (18) Age and sex dependent Log-normal
Reduction in RR of CAD in voluntary agreements strategy Mozzafarian et al. (4), O’Flaherty et al. (18) Age and sex dependent Log-normal
Reduction in RR of CAD in mandatory labeling strategy Mozzafarian et al. (4), O’Flaherty et al. (18) Age and sex dependent Log-normal
RR of second and subsequent CAD events after the first
event
Assumption 1.5 Log-normal
RR probability of death from second CAD event compared
with death from the first CAD event
Assumption 1.5 Log-normal
Production losses due to mortality Nichols et al. (28) V5101.94 g
Production losses due to morbidity Nichols et al. (28) V2158.88 g
Informal care Nichols et al. (28) V6440.19 g
Primary care Nichols et al. (28) V617.34 g
Outpatient care Nichols et al. (28) V854.56 g
Accident and emergency Nichols et al. (28) V213.78 g
In-patient care Nichols et al. (28) V3557.46 g
Medication Nichols et al. (28) V1605.36 g
School-based intervention Cecchini et al. (29), Sassi et al. (30) V1.15 g
Worksite intervention Cecchini et al. (29), Sassi et al. (30) V4.48 g
Mass media campaigns Cecchini et al. (29), Sassi et al. (30) V1.90 g
Physician counseling Cecchini et al. (29), Sassi et al. (30) V8.28 g
Program of food inspection Cecchini et al. (29), Sassi et al. (30) V0.86 g
1 CAD, coronary artery disease; HFA-DB, Health for All Database; IHD, ischemic heart disease; TFA, trans fatty acid.
2 Distributions were chosen following the recommendations in reference 31.
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report entitled “Improving lifestyles, tackling obesity: the health
and economic impact of prevention strategies” (30). Costs per
person per year have been adapted from this report and applied
to the model to best estimate the real costs to governments (costs
were adjusted by using the purchasing power parity methods to
adjust for cost of living between countries).
The following types of costs were considered (see also Table
1). The first 4 relate to the provision of information and coun-
seling on TFAs, TFA-related health issues, and interpretation of
food labels (if applicable).
1) School-based interventions costs: These include training
teachers and food service staff and additional curricular
activities, but exclude changes in food provision services.
2) Worksite interventions costs: These include costs from
activities subsidized by the public sector and held in work-
sites by employers.
3) Mass media campaigns costs: These include broadcasting
advertisements on national and local radio and television
channels and for designing, producing, and distributing
flyers and leaflets.
4) Physician counseling costs: These costs include counsel-
ing provided by physicians to targeted individuals.
5) Program of food inspection costs: These include the ad-
ministration, planning, enforcement, and resources needed
to manage food inspection.
Effects
The model calculates, for each option, CAD events and
mortality in yearly cycles over a period of 85 y. It is based on
current estimates of iTFA intake (detailed in reference 32 and as
shown in Supplemental Tables 1–3) and the assumed reductions
in TFA intake over the years as described above. In addition, the
RRs for CAD associated with the different TFA intakes are
based on the calculations in Mozaffarian et al. (4) in which the
“pooled multivariable-adjusted RR for 2%E of TFA, as an iso-
caloric replacement for carbohydrate, was 1.23 (95% CI = 1.11–
1.37).” This is then applied to the different iTFA intakes to
calculate the probability of a CAD event (see probability 2 in
Figure 1). For the starting point of the model (“today”) the risk
of CAD is calculated on the basis of hospital discharges (see
explanation below) and already includes the risks from current
iTFA intakes, which are specific according to country, age, and
sex (Supplemental Tables 1–3). The reduction in CAD risk
linked to iTFA reductions in the following years from “today” is
then calculated by using the RR above.
Subsequently, the resulting DALYs are then calculated on the
basis of the modeled number of CAD events and deaths. DALYs
reflect, in a single quantitative figure, years of life lost due to
premature death from illness and years lived with disability. To
calculate the DALYs averted in each strategy, the DALYs cal-
culation template from the Health Statistics and Health Informa-
tion Systems Office (WHO) was used, including the weightings
as reported in the Global Burden of Disease 2010 study (Institute
for Health Metrics and Evaluation) (33).
The model also includes the probabilities of having a CAD
event for the first time, of having another CAD event after the first
one, of death at any time and of death because of a CAD event (or
due to any cause; see Table 1). Other proposed beneficial effects
of lowering TFA intake, such as on insulin sensitivity, obesity,
diabetes, cancer, or early growth and development, were not
considered in the model because of inconsistent evidence and lack
of data (3, 6). The probabilities of having a CAD event were
calculated on the basis of the EU hospital discharges (27), because
this was the only source of relevant information and data. The lack
of CAD incidence data was also highlighted in the 2012 European
Cardiovascular Disease Statistics (30), in which hospital discharges
were suggested as an alternative source of incidence data. The
probabilities of dying at any time and of dying of CAD were
extracted from the European Health for All Database (HFA-DB
2010) (27) for the EU.
Dealing with uncertainty
There is substantial uncertainty with regard to some of the
data used in the model. For this reason, we ran the model for
various scenarios so as to assess the robustness of the outcome
in cases in which data are scarce, in particular with respect to the
current EU population’s TFA intake. We included 3 scenarios in
addition to the base case. In the base case we estimated different
initial iTFA intakes per age group and sex (overall average:
0.3 E%):
Scenario 1 assumes an initial overall average iTFA intake of
0.15 E% (50% of our base case estimates, assuming that
much improvement has been made since the latest estimates
reported in Supplemental Table 1).
Scenario 2 assumes an initial overall average iTFA intake of
0.45 E% (assuming that the situation in countries where no
estimates were identified is somewhat worse than in our
estimate).
Scenario 3 assumes an initial overall average iTFA intake of
0.7 E% [allowing for even higher initial iTFA intakes as sug-
gested from modeled data of total TFA intake (34) and as
presented in Supplemental Table 4 and after subtracting
an estimated 0.5 E% contribution from ruminant TFAs
(11)].
Population iTFA intakes in the 3 scenarios diminish in
a similar manner as the base case in each of the 4 policy options.
A summary of the initial iTFA population intakes for each
scenario is provided in Table 2.
In addition, this economic evaluation includes, next to the
deterministic analysis, which uses a single value for costs and for
effects in the model calculations, a probabilistic sensitivity
analysis (PSA). The PSA applies probabilistic distributions to
every variable in the model. Each of the distributions used in the
PSA were chosen following the current trends and literature
recommendations (i.e., g distribution for variables constrained to
be zero or positive or log-normal distribution for variables cal-
culated by using RRs) (31). These probabilistic distributions are
based on mean values and CIs, SDs, or ranges of values detailed
in the data sources. In this way, the PSA attempts to account for
uncertainty in existing evidence [e.g., in the estimates of the risk
of CAD linked to different TFA intakes (4)]. A summary of the
deterministic values and the distributions applied to them for the
PSA analysis are shown in Table 1. Both deterministic and
probabilistic analyses were performed for all of the scenarios.
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RESULTS
The resulting health effects and costs linked to each of the 4
policy options from the deterministic base case analysis are
presented in Table 3. It is important to note that the estimates
should not be taken at face value given that the model is
a simplification of reality and CAD events and deaths are not
“competing” against any other disease. Consequently, the ab-
solute numbers may be an overestimation of CAD events and
deaths avoided. This stems from the model’s limitations.
The results shown in Table 3 indicate that implementing a legal
limit at the EU level would result in the fewest costs to the public,
followed by the voluntary agreements, the reference situation of
no-EU-level action, and mandatory labeling. The main reason
that the lowest public costs are associated with limiting iTFA
contents in foodstuffs is that the reduction in the number of
estimated CAD events is greatest due to the lower population
intakes of cumulative iTFAs. The reduction in health care costs
and in indirect costs linked to informal care and productivity loss
outweighs the costs of implementing this policy, more than in any
of the other policy options. In contrast, the highest public costs in
the mandatory labeling options are due to the fact that the re-
duction in CAD cases obtained through this policy option is not
sufficient to compensate for the costs of the measures imple-
mented.When looking at the health outcomes, the results indicate
that introducing an EU-level legal limit on iTFAs in foodstuffs
would also result in the smallest number of DALYs. In contrast,
taking no action at the EU level (reference situation) would
produce the largest number of DALYs, followed by the options of
voluntary agreements and mandatory labeling.
To compare the policy options, the difference in costs and
DALYs of policy options 2–4 compared with the reference sit-
uation (option 1) were calculated and are presented in Table 4.
These calculations were based on deterministic analyses and
were carried out for the base case and the 3 alternative sce-
narios in which different initial population iTFA intakes were
assumed. In addition, the incremental cost-effectiveness ra-
tios (ICERs) for each of the 3 EU-level action policy options
are presented in Table 4. The ICER is calculated by dividing
the difference in costs between a policy option and the ref-
erence situation (no EU-level action) by the respective dif-
ference in effects (DALYs); the ICER is then interpreted as
the cost for each DALY gained and therefore a lower ICER is
preferred.
ICER ¼ Costs in policy option x2Costs in reference situation
DALYs in policy option x2DALYs in reference situation
ð1Þ
A policy option is considered dominant if it can save both costs
and DALYs when compared with the reference situation. This is
the case for the legal TFA limits and voluntary agreements pol-
icy options for the base case and in every scenario considered
for our model (Table 4). The legal limit option was found to
deliver the highest health benefits and largest cost savings of
all EU-level policy options, which remained true in all initial
TFA intake scenarios. According to the WHO definition (35),
a cost-effective option is that in which the cost-effectiveness
ratio is ,3 times the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per cap-
ita. Highly cost-effective options are those in which the cost-
effectiveness ratio is ,1 time the GDP per capita. In the case
of the EU, this latter threshold corresponding to the per capita
GDP is V23,300. In our evaluation, the mandatory labeling
strategy would not be considered cost-effective for the base
case or for scenario 1 (lower initial iTFA intakes than in the
base case) due to an ICER well above V23,300 and V69,900
(3 times the per capita GDP), whereas this strategy may be
cost-effective in cases in which initial iTFA intakes are still
relatively high, resulting in an ICER below the threshold (scenar-
ios 2 and 3, assuming higher initial iTFA intakes than in the base
case).
Because of the uncertainty associated with the wide distri-
bution of some of the model variable values and data (as de-
scribed in Table 1), we performed a PSA. Using the model, the
analysis was repeated 1000 times, and for each time a random
value within the range of values defined in the probability
TABLE 2
Overview of different initial iTFA intakes as estimated in the base case and
assumed in 3 alternative scenarios1





1 E%, percentage of total energy intake; iTFA, industrially produced
trans fatty acid.
2 Although the reduction speed differs between the 4 policy options,
0 E% iTFA intake will eventually be achieved in all of the options.
3 Averaged value; initial values in the model in the base case situation
differ for age and sex.
TABLE 3
Costs and DALYs associated with 4 policy options to reduce TFA intake in the EU (for the base case)1
Both sexes Women Men
Costs








(3 1 million), V
DALYs
(3 1 million)
No action 10,774,890 1077 5,464,667 341 5,310,223 735
Voluntary agreements 10,752,032 1075 5,453,164 341 5,298,867 733
Mandatory labeling 10,870,004 1076 5,513,480 341 5,356,524 734
Legal limit 10,723,635 1073 5,438,734 340 5,284,900 732
1Values are the result of a deterministic analysis for the full time horizon of the model (85 y) and were calculated by using age and sex specifications.
Although costs were similar for men and women, the number of DALYs is nearly double for men. This stems from a difference in ischemic heart disease–
related mortality (higher in men), which is reflected in the calculation of DALYs only. DALY, disability-adjusted life-year; EU, European Union; TFA, trans
fatty acid.
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distribution (see Table 1) was used for every input variable. Costs
and DALYs were calculated as outcomes for each individual
analysis. Importantly, the results obtained with the PSA were
similar to those obtained in the deterministic analysis, as shown
in Table 5. This indicates that variations in the values within the
ranges considered do not result in any significant differences in
the outcomes of the model. Table 6 shows the number of times
(percentage) in the 1000 outcomes that each policy option was
more or less effective than the reference situation. The fact that
this sensitivity analysis returns such high (nearly 100%) or low
(0%) probabilities reinforces the consistency of our model and
the strength of the previous results. Figure 2 depicts the
cost-effectiveness plane of the PSA for the base case scenario.
The estimates confirmed that legal limit and voluntary agree-
ments are the policy options in which more costs are saved
and more DALYs are avoided than in the reference situation.
These results are robust because the probability of saving costs
and DALYs in the PSA is 100%. In the base case scenario,
mandatory labeling does not appear to save costs but would also
avoid DALYs in 100% of the trials.
Overall, the estimates in Table 5 indicate that imposing legal
limits on the iTFA content in foods could savewV76 billion and
avoid 5.32 million DALYs over an 85-y period compared with
the current situation, with a 100% of probability of being cost-
effective. The similarity between the direction of the results
obtained in the PSA and the deterministic analyses highlights
the robustness of the model, although values in the PSA are
higher than in the deterministic analysis. Both show that the 3
alternative EU-level action policy options are more effective
than the reference situation of not acting at the EU level. As in
the deterministic analysis, the PSA confirms that legal limits
and voluntary agreements strategies are dominant (i.e., they
provide health benefits and save costs), whereas mandatory
labeling is highly cost-effective (in terms of GDP per capita
threshold) only in scenarios 2 and 3, assuming higher (0.45
and 0.7 E%) than base case estimated initial iTFA intakes.
TABLE 4
Comparison of the differences in costs and DALYs between the 3 different EU-level action policy options and the reference situation of not acting at the EU
level for the base case and the 3 scenarios (deterministic analysis)1

















Legal limit vs. no EU action 251,255 23.73 210,686 21.26 2129,684 28.59 2279,241 216.65
Voluntary agreements vs.
no EU action
222,858 22.19 22478 20.75 270,815 25.15 2157,017 210.03
Mandatory labeling vs.
no EU action
95,114 20.98 104,046 20.42 66,159 22.90 18,553 25.62
ICER
Legal limit Dominant Dominant Dominant Dominant
Voluntary agreements Dominant Dominant Dominant Dominant
Mandatory labeling 296,608 2244,913 222,840 23301
1Values are the result of a deterministic analysis for the full time horizon of the model (85 y). Negative numbers express costs saved and DALYs averted when
compared with the reference situation. The absolute value of the ICER (calculated by dividing “D Costs” and “D DALYs”) represents the cost to the public for each DALY
averted for a policy option against the reference of not acting at the EU level. A “dominant” ICER indicates that the policy option in question averts DALYs and saves
money. DALY, disability-adjusted life-year; EU, European Union; ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; D Costs, differences in costs; D DALYs, difference in DALYs.
TABLE 5
Comparison of the mean of the differences in costs and DALYs between the 3 different EU-level action policy options and the reference situation of not
acting at the EU level for the base case and 3 scenarios (probabilistic sensitivity analysis)1

















Legal limit vs. no EU action 276,478 25.32 29,127 21.13 2144,010 29.65 2273,864 216.67
Voluntary agreements vs.
no EU action
235,603 22.93 21684 20.68 279,067 25.79 2153,857 210.04
Mandatory labeling vs.
no EU action
89,153 21.39 104,736 20.38 59,942 23.25 20,144 25.63
ICER
Legal limit Dominant Dominant Dominant Dominant
Voluntary agreements Dominant Dominant Dominant Dominant
Mandatory labeling 264,363 2274,163 218,433 23580
1Values are the means of 1000 outcomes in a probabilistic sensitivity analysis for the full time horizon of the model (85 y). Negative numbers express savings when
compared with the reference situation. The absolute value of the ICER (calculated by dividing “D Costs” and “D DALYs”) represents the cost to the public for each DALY
averted for a policy option against the reference of not acting at the EU level. A “dominant” ICER indicates that the policy option in question averts DALYs and saves
money. DALY, disability-adjusted life-year; EU, European Union; ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; D Costs, differences in costs; D DALYs, difference in DALYs.
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DISCUSSION
The results of the model indicate that both introducing an EU-
level legal limit and making voluntary agreements would save
money and provide additional health benefits (avoiding DALYs)
compared with not taking action at the EU level. Note also that
although our analysis is focused on the EUmarket, it is likely that
any action at the EU level would also affect the presence of
iTFAs in foods and iTFA intake in other non-EU countries.
Despite a variety of uncertainties associated with some of the
data included in the model, the PSA suggests that these results are
robust because both policy options are dominant (saving costs
and DALYs) in 100% of the trials in the PSA and the CIs are quite
narrow. The same occurred for every scenario tested, except for
the voluntary agreements in scenario 1, which assumed the lowest
initial population iTFA intake of only 0.15 E% (90.6% proba-
bility). Although important, the cost-effectiveness of a particular
policy option is not the only variable to be considered by policy
makers to implement new policies. For example, our model
focused on public expenditure and did not contemplate any
potential costs incurred by the industry or other players when
limiting iTFA content in foods. This is common practice in
public health economic evaluations (25). In addition, neither EU
member states nor EU stakeholders have pinpointed costs related
to removing partially hydrogenated oils (PHOs) from foods (22).
This is probably linked to the gradual progress in the innovation
of PHO alternatives and the fact that the EU food industry has,
over time, already removed PHOs from food products to a large
extent (32).
Although our model applied a lifetime horizon (85 y) for
calculating health effects and costs, others used shorter time
horizons (15–18). The time horizon needs to be sufficiently long
to reflect all important differences in costs or outcomes between
the policy options under comparison (25). We decided that a life-
time time horizon was appropriate because the varying iTFA
intakes linked to the 4 policy options led to differences in sur-
vival and benefits that persist throughout a person’s life.
Introducing mandatory TFA labeling at the EU level, re-
gardless of the scenario analyzed, also has the potential to avert
DALYs but not costs. In general, the differences in costs between
the different policy options are driven by the costs related to the
incidence of CAD. However, in cases in which the difference in
CAD incidence between an alternative option and the reference
situation is low, such as the case for mandatory TFA labeling, the
leading costs then stem from the costs of the measures (school-
based interventions, worksite interventions, mass media cam-
paigns, physician counseling, and food inspection programs).
With regard to the differences in DALYs, these are mostly due
to the number of CAD events and related premature deaths, as
well as the number of years living with disability and the number
of years lost because of premature death. Small resulting differences
TABLE 6
Probabilities of each EU-level action policy option to save costs and DALYs when compared with the reference situation in the base case and 3 scenarios1



















Voluntary agreements 100 100 90.6 100 100 100 100 100
Mandatory labeling 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100
Legal limit 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1Values refer to the probabilistic sensitivity analysis for the full time horizon of the model (85 y). DALY, disability-adjusted life-year; EU, European
Union.
FIGURE 2 Cost-effectiveness plane. Costs saved against DALYs avoided for each EU-level action policy option against the reference of no EU-level
action. The single colored circles represent the outcome of 1 single analysis in the probabilistic sensitivity analysis for each TFA-related EU-level policy
option. Each set of colored circles therefore depicts the variation in costs saved against DALYs avoided as a result of the uncertainty in the model input
variables. The cost-effectiveness plane is presented for the base case analysis, and values were calculated by using age and sex specifications for the full time
horizon of the model (85 y). DALY, disability-adjusted life-year; EU, European Union; TFA, trans fatty acid.
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in CAD are particularly likely in scenario 1, in which the lowest
initial iTFA intakes are assumed.
In this study, we assumed a rather rapid removal of iTFAs from
the EU food supply over 10 y, including in the reference situation
in which no EU-level action is taken (we assumed efforts at the
national level instead). This rather optimistic assumption for the
reference situation means that we used a conservative approach in
our conclusions on the EU-level action policy options. Health
benefits would be even larger and cost savings more likely should
iTFA intakes decrease more slowly than what is assumed in the
reference situation in which no EU-level action is taken.
As discussed previously, some of the model variables or input
data used here are rather uncertain and several assumptions had to
be made. There are 3 major sources of potential errors: the es-
timated current TFA intake, the wide variability observed for
many variables between countries, and the lack of data in some
instances, such as the lack of data on the number of CAD events
per year (CAD-related hospital discharges were used instead). To
address the concerns related to the accuracy of estimated iTFA
intake values entered in the model, we used different scenarios
with different values for initial iTFA intake. In all of the scenarios
and for all policy options it was assumed that, with time, iTFA
intakes will eventually decrease to 0 E%. This seems reasonable
given the current estimates of iTFA intakes of w0.01 E% for
Denmark, where a legal limit on iTFA contents of foods has
been in place for 10 y (see Supplemental Tables 1 and 2 and
reference 22). The wide variability in the data between European
countries and the absence of reliable data on the incidence of
CAD are addressed with the PSA. As discussed above, the ro-
bustness of the results obtained with the PSA indicates that,
despite the uncertainties associated with the input data, the
outcome is still valid and reliable. Again, however, we note that
the absolute numbers estimated by the model are likely to
overestimate the number of CAD events.
The results presented here should be interpreted as a com-
parison between different policy options rather than consider-
ing absolute costs, DALYs, or deaths per option. Previous work
has shown the benefits of TFA intake reduction (18). Recently,
the Food and Drug Administration also released a “final de-
termination” that PHOs, the primary dietary source of iTFAs,
are no longer considered to be “generally recognized as safe”
products (36). This was accompanied by a memorandum that
estimated costs and potential health effects of limiting iTFA
content in foods in the United States (17). The authors in-
dicated that “monetizing the lives saved, along with the value
of the nonfatal illnesses and medical expenses prevented,
yields an estimated benefit of $14.7 billion/y, starting 3 y after
the elimination of partially hydrogenated oils from the food
supply.” Although the model used and the real costs and DALYs
calculated in that memorandum differ considerably from those
presented here, the conclusions are similar, namely that re-
moving iTFAs from the US food supply would save costs and
DALYs.
In conclusion, the results of this study suggest additional health
benefits and reductions in public spending when taking EU-level
action toward reducing population iTFA intakes. Although now
introducing a mandatory TFA labeling scheme may not be a cost-
effective solution in the EU, both a legal limit on the iTFA content
in foods and voluntary agreements toward removing PHOs from
foods produce large-enough reductions in CAD morbidity and
mortality that the related reductions in costs outweigh the costs
linked to the implementation of these strategies. Finally, in-
troducing a legal limit at the EU level would produce the greatest
health benefits of all of the options included in this study.
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E, Ocké M. Dutch National Food Consumption Survey 2007-2010: diet
of children and adults aged 7 to 69 years. Bilthoven (Netherlands): The
Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment
(RIVM), 2011. RIVM report 350050006.
11. Hulshof KF, van Erp-Baart MA, Anttolainen M, Becker W, Church
SM, Couet C, Hermann-Kunz E, Kesteloot H, Leth T, Martins I, et al.
Intake of fatty acids in western Europe with emphasis on trans fatty
acids: the TRANSFAIR study. Eur J Clin Nutr 1999;53:143–57.
12. Stender S, Astrup A, Dyerberg J. Artificial trans fat in popular foods in
2012 and in 2014: a market basket investigation in six European
countries. BMJ Open 2016;6:e010673.
13. Stender S, Astrup A, Dyerberg J. Tracing artificial trans fat in popular
foods in Europe: a market basket investigation. BMJ Open 2014;4:
e005218.
14. Stender S, Astrup A, Dyerberg J. A trans European Union difference in
the decline in trans fatty acids in popular foods: a market basket in-
vestigation. BMJ Open 2012;2:e000859.
15. O’Keeffe C, Kabir Z, O’Flaherty M, Walton J, Capewell S, Perry IJ.
Modelling the impact of specific food policy options on coronary heart
disease and stroke deaths in Ireland. BMJ Open 2013;3:e002837.
8 of 9 MARTIN-SABORIDO ET AL.
16. Barton P, Andronis L, Briggs A, McPherson K, Capewell S. Effec-
tiveness and cost effectiveness of cardiovascular disease prevention in
whole populations: modelling study. BMJ 2011;343:d4044.
17. US Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Ad-
ministration. Estimate of Costs and Benefits of Removing Partially
Hydrogenated Oils (PHOs) from the US Food Supply. College Park,
MD: US Food and Drug Administration. [memorandum from R. Bruns
to M. Honigfort, June 11, 2015.]
18. O’Flaherty M, Flores-Mateo G, Nnoaham K, Lloyd-Williams F,
Capewell S. Potential cardiovascular mortality reductions with stricter
food policies in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland. Bull World Health Organ 2012;90:522–31.
19. Restrepo BJ, Rieger M. Denmark’s policy on artificial trans fat and
cardiovascular disease. Am J Prev Med 2016;50:69–76.
20. Allen K, Pearson-Stuttard J, Hooton W, Diggle P, Capewell S,
O’Flaherty M. Potential of trans fats policies to reduce socioeconomic
inequalities in mortality from coronary heart disease in England: cost
effectiveness modelling study. BMJ 2015;351:h4583.
21. European Commission. Report from the Commission to the European
Parliament and Council regarding trans fats in foods and in the overall
diet of the Union population. Brussels (Belgium): European Com-
mission, 2015. [COM(2015) 619 final]
22. European Commission. Commission staff working document—results
of the Commission’s consultations on ’trans fatty acids in foodstuffs in
Europe’. Brussels (Belgium): European Commission, 2015. [SWD(2015)
268 final]
23. Roberts M, Russell LB, Paltiel AD, Chambers M, McEwan P, Krahn
M. Conceptualizing a model: a report of the ISPOR-SMDM Modeling
Good Research Practices Task Force–2. Value Health 2012;15:804–11.
24. Siebert U, Alagoz O, Bayoumi AM, Jahn B, Owens DK, Cohen DJ,
Kuntz KM; ISPOR-SMDM Modeling Good Research Practices Task
Force. State-transition modeling: a report of the ISPOR-SMDM
Modeling Good Research Practices Task Force–3. Value Health 2012;
15:812–20.
25. Earnshaw J, Lewis G. NICE guide to the methods of technology ap-
praisal. Pharmacoeconomics 2008;26:725–7.
26. Strazzullo P, Cairella G, Campanozzi A, Carcea M, Galeone D, Galletti F,
Giampaoli S, Iacoviello L, Scalfi L; GIRCSI Working Group. Population
based strategy for dietary salt intake reduction: Italian initiatives in the
European framework. Nutr Metab Cardiovasc Dis 2012;22:161–6.
27. European Health for All Database (HFA-DB) [Internet]. 2013. [cited
2013 June 10] Available from: http://www.euro.who.int/en/what-we-
do/data-and-evidence/databases/european-health-for-all-database-hfa-db2.
28. Nichols MTN, Luengo-Fernandez R, Leal J, Gray A, Scarborough P,
Rayner M. European Cardiovascular Disease Statistics 2012. Brussels
(Belgium): European Heart Network, European Society of Cardiology;
2012.
29. Cecchini M, Sassi F, Lauer JA, Lee YY, Guajardo-Barron V, Chisholm
D. Tackling of unhealthy diets, physical inactivity, and obesity: health
effects and cost-effectiveness. Lancet 2010;376:1775–84.
30. Sassi F, Cecchini M, Lauer J, Chisholm D. Improving lifestyles,
tackling obesity: the health and economic impact of prevention strat-
egies. OECD Health working paper 48. OECD, Paris; 2009.[Internet]
[cited 2013 June 10]. Available from: http://www.who.int/choice/
publications/d_OECD_prevention_report.pdf
31. Briggs AH, Weinstein MC, Fenwick EA, Karnon J, Sculpher MJ,
Paltiel AD. Model parameter estimation and uncertainty: a report of the
ISPOR-SMDM Modeling Good Research Practices Task Force–6.
Value Health 2012;15:835–42.
32. Mouratidou T, Livaniou A, Martin Saborido C, Wollgast J, Louro
Caldeira S. Trans fatty acids in Europe: where do we stand? Lux-
embourg (Luxembourg): Publications Office of the European Union,
2014. [EUR 26795 EN]
33. Murray CJ, Vos T, Lozano R, Naghavi M, Flaxman AD, Michaud C,
Ezzati M, Shibuya K, Salomon JA, Abdalla S, et al. Disability-adjusted
life years (DALYs) for 291 diseases and injuries in 21 regions, 1990–
2010: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study
2010. Lancet 2012;380:2197–223.
34. Micha R, Khatibzadeh S, Shi P, Fahimi S, Lim S, Andrews KG, Engell
RE, Powles J, Ezzati M, Mozaffarian D; Global Burden of Diseases
Nutrition and Chronic Diseases Expert Group (NutriCoDE). Global,
regional, and national consumption levels of dietary fats and oils in
1990 and 2010: a systematic analysis including 266 country-specific
nutrition surveys. BMJ 2014;348:g2272.
35. World Health Organization. Choosing interventions that are cost ef-
fective (WHO-CHOICE).Cost-effectiveness threshold. Geneva (Swit-
zerland): World Health Organization; 2005.
36. US Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Ad-
ministration. Final determination regarding partially hydrogenated oils.
Federal Register. 2015;80:34650–34670.
ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF POLICIES TO REDUCE TFAS 9 of 9
